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Chapter 2.

PPP institutional set-up recommendations

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1. The typical functions and their delineation

1.1 The development of a public-private partnership (PPP) framework requires an adequate and appropriate institutional set-up. An effective PPP institutional set-up is essential for modernising infrastructure and enhancing the attractiveness of PPP arrangements. Well-designed frameworks will make it easier to initiate and implement different PPP projects. Developing a suitable PPP institutional framework in every Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) member country is a long-term process and, in the years after the relevant legislation is adopted, this framework is likely to be complex and multifaceted. Effective governance of a PPP system by the government bodies and institutions involved is critical to the success of that system. It takes time and thought to define and develop all the relevant roles and relationships, and to carry out all the necessary capacity building.¹

1.2 The best way to conduct an institutional analysis is first to determine the functions needed to develop and implement good PPPs. The next step is to look at which actors (organisational entities) in the CIS member country are best suited to playing which roles. In other words, the focus should first be on what needs to be done to enable the development and implementation of sound PPPs in a CIS member country, and then to allocate obligations between the state government authorities (SGAs) and municipal authorities of that country.²

1.3 The general principles for creating an institutional set-up in a CIS member country are as follows:

- The programme should be developed on the basis of existing institutional functions and processes.
- Account should be taken of the possible objectives of infrastructural development and infrastructure policies.
- The programme should be built in accordance with PPP policies and programmes.
- The responsibilities should be properly distributed among relevant SGAs.
- Overlaps, conflict of interests and excessive procedures should be avoided.

1.4 Typical functions are recommended to delegate to existing or new SGAs while developing a PPP

framework in a CIS member country:

- developing PPP policy, coordinating and promoting PPP development
- enacting PPP legislation, regulations, guidelines and recommendations
- identification and procurement of PPP projects, including project screening, appraisal, structuring, conducting tender procedures and contract management
- approving PPP projects
- ensuring coordination between authorities and best-practice approaches
- public financial management, identifying sources and providing required financing.

1.5 As mentioned, there can be different bodies and institutions with functions in the sphere of PPPs. All SGAs participating in the preparation, approval, procurement, implementation and monitoring of PPP projects should be given clear mandates and sufficient resources to ensure the high-quality, efficient and successful development of PPPs.

1.6 The government should be the main policymaker in respect of PPPs and should develop PPP policy and coordinate and promote PPP development. Responsibilities such as the enactment of PPP legislation, regulations, guidelines and recommendations can be distributed among the law-making authority (PPP legislation), the government of a CIS member country (PPP regulations) and the PPP unit (non-mandatory regulation).

1.7 The government should be empowered to determine priority sectors for PPPs and stimulate private parties to participate in infrastructure projects. The government is advised to consider that the development of an effective PPP policy requires active consultations and engagement with all stakeholders and end-users. The government may create committees with representatives of different ministries, the private sector and the general public to ensure their views are taken into account. Another way to consider their opinion is by involving PPP development institutions as provided by the CIS Model PPP Law. These institutions may conduct surveys and studies and organise and moderate discussions and conferences.

¹ For an example of a CIS country's PPP institutional set-up, including PPP units, see Government of the Republic of Armenia (2022), Decision No.1118-N of 28 July 2022 on Approving the Procedure for Public Private Partnerships, Yerevan.

² For examples of best standards related to the institutional set-up of PPP units, see OECD (2010), *Dedicated Public-Private Partnership Units: A Survey of Institutional and Governance Structures*, Paris; EPEC (2014), *Establishing and Reforming PPP Units – Analysis of EPEC Member PPP Units and Lessons Learnt*, Luxembourg; EPEC (2012), *United Kingdom – England PPP Units and Related Institutional Framework*, Luxembourg.

1.8 An executive body responsible for implementing the government's PPP policy should be created. It may be an existing ministry or the government may establish a new body as a separate ministry or agency (or a department within an existing ministry). Another option is to delegate certain functions – such as identification and procurement of PPP projects, including project screening, appraisal, structuring, conducting tender procedures and contract management – to the PPP unit or to spread them among different authorities. Responsibilities for procurement and conducting tender procedures can be delegated to the procuring authority.

1.9 The power of project approval may be assigned to the line minister, the government or other SGAs (for example, depending on the project's value).

1.10 Governments are advised to clearly define the role of the PPP unit, the procuring and controlling authorities, and the line ministry in PPP projects in a transparent and consistent manner to avoid any conflicts of interest or unclear and/or overlapping responsibilities.

1.11 It is also recommended to create an oversight body. The government may establish a new body that will oversee the preparation and implementation of PPP projects, the compliance of tender procurement with the requirements of applicable legislation and the effective use of budgetary funds in PPP projects. However, if existing authorities are responsible for procurement and budget control, the government may delegate these tasks to them.

1.12 SGAs may have little experience in the PPP sphere, so a body to ensure best-practice approaches should be established. The responsibility of ensuring best-practice application can be allocated to a dedicated PPP unit or to PPP departments within line ministries. External consultants should be engaged, especially for complicated and high-value PPP projects.

1.13 To coordinate the PPP process, special committees for large PPP projects should be created with representatives from different SGAs to avoid bureaucratic and other delays. Alternatively, an SGA may establish a PPP department that deals with PPP projects, including contract management. Another way is to involve a planning ministry that performs coordination functions in infrastructure and economic policy.

1.14 It is recommended that the ministry of finance (or other SGA responsible for public finance) have functions in public fiscal management, identifying sources of funding (such as state programmes or budgets) and providing required financing for

PPP projects. It should be involved in the project preparation process to ensure that the PPP project creates the best value for money and value for the people and that all fiscal risks are managed.

1.15 There has been a growing trend to have one unit in the country that deals with infrastructure investment, with just one office of that unit dealing with PPPs (and another office dealing with public investment projects, perhaps). There are numerous advantages to having an overarching entity with functions over all infrastructure investment in the country. For example, the kind of appraisal needed is similar for both private- and public-sector projects and, to the extent possible, this entity can ensure methodologies are the same – or at least consistent.



2. PPP unit

2.1 The existing institutional set-up in a country should be considered, as it plays a significant role in determining why a country would decide to establish a PPP unit. Although there are arguments against establishing units, such as the need for separate policy formulation and technical support during project implementation or to avoid conflicts of interest, many countries have created such units. The existence of a PPP unit often demonstrates the government's commitment to PPPs. It also demonstrates to potential private partners that the government has the requisite skills to manage PPPs. SGAs should be aware that once a higher public entity has made the initial decision to go down the PPP or public-investment route, one of the main objectives of establishing the PPP unit is to verify that the PPP is the best public procurement form for the project and that it creates the best value for money.

2.2 The typical functions of the PPP unit are:

PPP policy development: Develop and update PPP policy, prepare a long-term infrastructure plan, initiate or propose changes in primary legislation, and review and possibly update the PPP policy from time to time covering optimum ways of developing the country's plans for harnessing PPPs and attracting private-sector involvement.

- **Developing a list (pipeline) of PPP projects to be prepared:** Develop a pipeline of potential PPP projects by working with SGAs.

- **Legislation framework development:** Initiate the necessary changes in primary and secondary legislation in accordance with PPP policy and PPP/ infrastructure programmes.

- **Mandatory regulations on procedures and methodologies:** Help the relevant SGA establish mandatory regulations on procedures and methodologies, including the preparation and updating of regulations, mandatory guidelines and methodologies – for example, relating to feasibility studies and appraisal processes, possibly preparing required model PPP agreement clauses or structures.

- **Appraisal or review of specific PPP projects:** Appraise the project, based on the feasibility report, and reach conclusions about the feasibility and soundness of the PPP project before it is approved – or review the appraisal made by another SGA.

- **Decision to proceed (or not to proceed) with specific projects:** A decision based on an appraisal carried out by the same or another body. This function involves approval (or rejection) at several different points in the project preparation process and helps avoid spending money to fully prepare a PPP project when an early assessment would have determined that the project is not appropriate and should not be pursued.

- **General advice about how to apply regulations and prepare PPP projects:** General guidance for SGAs and other stakeholders about how to apply the law and regulations and prepare PPP projects. This advice also explains the regulations to SGAs, broadly advising them in face-to-face meetings on how to prepare and structure specific projects and how to hire and manage transaction advisers and experts.

- **Collection, analysis and reporting of data about PPPs and results:** Analyse project reports and the PPP database, prioritise the project master plan and so on (the transparency and availability of data to both the public and private sectors will be vital), collect information about PPP projects in the CIS member country and their performance, especially by requiring

copies of contractually required project reports to be sent to the PPP unit, maintain the project database, analyse and report findings.

- **Non-mandatory guidance on PPPs:** Prepare or disseminate non-mandatory guidance materials, best practice notes and so on, disseminate sample PPP agreement clauses.

- **Capacity building:** Organise training courses for SGAs.

- **PPP coordination and promotion:** Make introductory presentations about PPPs to SGAs, organisations and companies on the basic concepts and to promote the PPP model. Liaise with PPP units or staff in other SGAs, and discuss critical issues with other SGAs to try to find ways to overcome identified obstacles. Maintain contacts and coordinate with other players outside government that are working on PPPs to understand what they are doing, bring organisations together, share best practice, fill gaps and so on.

- **Work to improve the financing of PPPs:** Suggest financing and credit-enhancement methods for PPPs to international donors, as well as private-sector financing.

- **Intensive transaction advice and support for specific PPP projects:** Actively participate in preparing the PPP project; for example, take part in the tender committee and in negotiations.

- **Direct monitoring of results:** Proactively monitor each PPP project to ensure that the private partner is performing in compliance with the PPP agreement and applicable regulations. Potentially have the power to enforce compliance and impose deductions and penalties for poor performance.

2.3 The functions of the PPP unit depend greatly on the institutional set-up and the laws of the CIS member country. It is recommended that the government delegate powers to approve, conduct tendering procedures, and award and manage a PPP project to other competent bodies. This is to avoid possible conflicts of interest that could arise if the PPP unit were to give hands-on intensive transaction advice, then also appraise and green-light the project.

2.4 If the PPP unit was established as non-dedicated unit, it should initially focus on those functions that are most important, to ensure that substantially unsound PPP projects are not implemented. It should not attempt to fine-tune the projects; that should be left to the public partner. Other functions, while not to be ignored, can be given more emphasis later. The core functions in relation to this goal could be seen as the following:

- Mandatory and associated regulations: General advice about how to apply the regulations.
- Non-mandatory guidance about PPPs: Appraisal or review of specific PPP projects and, linked to that for state-level projects, approval power.
- Collection, analysis and reporting of information: These functions form a coherent whole and serve the main objective well.

Mandatory regulations set out the requirements for preparing and properly appraising PPP projects. These need to be supplemented by non-mandatory guidance to fill in the details for users. The main way the PPP unit can obtain feedback on how the regulations are being applied and any problems in their application is by reviewing some feasibility reports and appraisals of the PPP projects. Lastly, understanding how PPPs actually perform is key to knowing how to design and appraise them better in the first place.

2.5 Governments are advised to establish a system of interaction between the PPP unit and other SGAs. The PPP unit shall not deprive these SGAs of their authority, but work jointly with them. Investors, already accustomed to working with these entities, can continue to do so.

2.6 The PPP unit shall work closely with the relevant SGAs (and their PPP cells/departments), which will remain ultimately responsible for all PPP projects. As the “owners” and gatekeepers of PPP projects, the SGAs and public partners will take project-related decisions at all stages of the project.

2.7 Measures designed to improve the performance of existing PPP units in CIS member countries include the following:

- conducting training, seminars and other events to increase the level of competence of the staff of the PPP unit and other SGAs in the field of PPP
- analysing the PPP unit’s activities to identify possible obstacles and granting additional powers or redistributing powers between SGAs to ensure the PPP unit’s effective implementation of its functions
- surveying and researching the views of the staff of the PPP unit and other SGAs to identify the main difficulties they face in carrying out activities in the field of PPP and to search for possible measures to remove legal and other restrictions
- providing material, technical and financial support for the activities of the PPP unit in accordance with its functions and the scope of powers
- introducing a system of rewards and penalties for the PPP unit’s staff to stimulate responsible and efficient work

- exchanging international experience with other PPP units in CIS member countries and building regular communication and cooperation to conduct joint research, analysis and activities in the field of PPP.

3. Recommendations on the form, size and role of the PPP unit

3.1 There are two main approaches to establishing a PPP unit: as an independent dedicated unit or keeping it as a department/commission in an SGA. A dedicated PPP unit is an organisation set up with the full or partial help of the government to ensure that the necessary capacity to create, support and evaluate multiple PPP agreements is available and clustered together within government. The PPP unit deals with multiple PPPs. This is an important distinction to differentiate a dedicated PPP unit for government from a dedicated PPP project unit that may be located in an SGA to support the management of an individual project. The functions, location and jurisdiction of dedicated PPP units shall conform to each CIS member country’s needs and possibilities to create a high-quality PPP framework. PPP units may provide policy guidance, technical support, capacity building, promotion and/or direct funding for PPP projects. They can also be required to green-light a project before it can go forward. They may be located within an independent body or a centralised unit within the finance ministry, or devolved within dedicated units in one or more line ministries.

3.2 The decision to establish a dedicated PPP unit depends on a combination of factors, including the types of institution already in place, the sectoral composition of PPPs under consideration, the operation, construction and various stages of preparation, and the political commitment of the government. There is no clear evidence that a dedicated PPP unit is more advantageous for improving the deal flow or quality of the resulting PPP project than if ministries or the government independently implemented the project.

3.3 Where PPP units primarily screen PPPs, assess value for money and affordability to the government or disseminate good practices, they often take the form of a cell or group within an existing SGA. That SGA is often the finance ministry or treasury, reflecting concerns about a need to strengthen the understanding and monitoring of the fiscal costs of PPPs.

3.4 Where PPP units are to provide transactional support, their ability to buy in these skills from the private sector and provide the right incentives to staff to close deals requires close attention.

- One option is to establish a unit within a ministry and rely on long-term consultants/experts.
- Another option, creating greater independence from the government, is to set up the PPP unit as an autonomous entity, attached to but not fully part of the government bureaucracy.
- A third approach is a government-owned company. It is overseen by a public-private board and offers salaries outside the normal civil service ranges to attract people with key financial and transactional skills.
- A fourth way is to set up a joint-venture company owned in part by private shareholders. Such units often receive performance-based payments linked to deal closure.

3.5. There are numerous advantages to creating a dedicated PPP unit. PPP units can:

- operate independently from the government of the CIS member state and other SGAs in terms of PPP policy formulation and implementation
- carry out activities to develop the PPP market, aimed at improving the investment climate for the implementation of PPP projects
- act as a knowledge centre on PPP project preparation, negotiation and execution
- help regulate the creation of PPPs by SGAs to ensure that they fulfil all requirements in terms of affordability, value for money and risk transfer
- ensure that appropriate budgetary considerations are taken for PPP projects and that contingent budgetary liabilities are also evaluated
- exercise centralised control over the implementation of PPP projects; among other things, they can be used to manage risks in PPP projects and may also be entrusted with state supervision in the field of PPP
- give a boost to a country's PPP programme, soliciting projects, attracting potential partners/investors, building trust and goodwill with private partners.
- centralise knowledge, generate cost savings for the government and improve SGA staff capacity to implement PPPs.

3.6 Disadvantages of a dedicated PPP unit include:

- They can make the PPP process more complicated and bureaucratic, adding preparation costs and creating delays.

• The same authority that develops policy for traditional procurement can also develop a PPP policy.

• A dedicated PPP unit may not separate policy formulation and implementation if it can directly fund PPP projects.

• There may be no need for a PPP unit if knowledge can be supplied by internal and external project advisers appointed directly by SGAs with specific expertise in the relevant sectoral area and/or project issues.

• SGAs and the finance/planning ministry have expertise in assessing costs and benefits of projects and prioritising projects politically.

• The closer a dedicated PPP unit is to the relevant political leadership, the more susceptible it is to political influence in deciding which PPP projects should be initiated.

• Establishing a dedicated unit may imply implicit approval of PPP as a policy tool and weaken the case for other viable procurement methods.

• A dedicated PPP unit reveals weaknesses early on, such as having a poorly prepared PPP programme, a low level of legislative initiatives and legal technique, and a lack of expertise and experience in preparing and implementing PPP projects.

3.7 Regardless of its form, the PPP unit should develop internal procedures, checklists, guides and so on for the staff's core activities. This would help make the activities more effective.

3.8 The PPP unit must be able to review at least a sample of the feasibility reports and the appraisals of PPP projects at the municipal level. If the PPP unit develops the mandatory regulations and the non-mandatory guidance material, but has no knowledge of how these are actually being applied at the municipal level, it will be operating blindly and the regulations will not benefit from the best feedback. One option to ensure that the PPP unit's advice and recommendations are accepted at the municipal level is to establish it as an independent unit from the central government body and an expert organisation. Another option is to create subdivisions of the PPP unit in different sub-sovereigns or to let sub-sovereigns establish their own PPP units.

3.9. It is difficult to estimate the number of staff needed to conduct PPP unit activities because this depends on the future deal flow of PPP projects, as well as how qualified/trained staff must be to efficiently carry out appraisals and reviews.

3.10 Where necessary, PPP units either need to have a budget for contracting out certain activities or to increase interaction with potential donors who can provide funds for that purpose. Some of the activities the PPP unit needs to carry out are highly specialised and occur only infrequently (for instance, writing certain guides). These are best contracted out, with close supervision by the unit.

3.11 Dedicated PPP units may be funded from the government budget, through user charges or a combination of both. Government budget financing refers to funds appropriated through the annual government budget. The precise details will vary depending on the budget's appropriation structures and rules. User charges are levied on a government organisation to capture the cost, in part or in full, of services provided to other government organisations in implementing their activities and delivering public services. Funding is influenced by the location of the dedicated PPP unit, as well as practices with regard to charging for services more generally within the government.

3.12 PPP units can be financed through project development facilities that are funded through government and donor funds. As a result, the proceeds of project development facilities are used to finance the project preparation and operation of the PPP unit. The project development facilities operate on a revolving basis and a winning bidder may reimburse the budget the unit has spent on a specific project.

3.13 The PPP unit could benefit from intensive training that involves independent consultants working with the unit as it appraises or reviews several real-life PPP proposals. The unit must put considerable effort into strengthening its skills in project appraisal techniques. Traditional training courses are useful, of course, but closely combining training with actual cases is especially important.

4. Improving the regulatory framework

4.1 Improving legislation often consists of simplifying it and focusing more on its users. Investors involved in PPP projects require a predictable and reliable regulatory framework, such as low quantity, simplicity and quality of norms.

In addition, the regulatory framework should take into account the interests of end-users and enable them to participate in legal procedures that protect their rights and guarantee them access to the decision-making process.

4.2 PPP development should be based on the following key principles and priorities:

- protection of investors' rights when disposing of their property and assets
- improving the quality of the regulatory framework by reducing the number of legal norms and improving and simplifying them
- a more attentive approach to the interests of business
- improving the efficiency of control over compliance with the requirements of agreements
- developing a system of rules and regulations for PPPs based on consultations on issues directly related to the launch of projects and their management, including concessions, taxes, competition, procurement and company regulation.

4.3 The PPP regulatory framework should not be constraining and should allow the parties to focus on the result by establishing sufficient opportunities for the preparation and implementation of projects. Excessively voluminous legislation slows the process of creating and managing PPP projects and inhibits the activity of potential investors. It is recommended to focus on the flexibility of the regulatory framework.

4.4 Laws should be understandable and reliable and allow investors to plan their decisions and set long-term goals when entering the market. This factor is significant for attracting high-quality investments in PPP projects. A predictable regulatory framework is especially important when implementing PPP programmes, as predictability allows for more accurate risk assessment.

4.5 PPP processes are often very complex. This leads to higher costs, as well as to the fact that only the largest companies remain among the candidates for contracts. In general, simplification of rules promotes competition, which in turn expands the range of applicants for a contract, which will allow government agencies to choose the best partners for them.



Addendum 1:

Typical functions of PPP units around the world

1. As follows from international practice, PPP units are asked to perform a range of functions. As governments turn to the private sector to provide services once delivered by the public sector, they must learn new skills. An increasingly common way of providing the capacity needed is to establish PPP units as dedicated bodies or as special departments/agencies within an SGA, such as a finance or planning ministry.
2. One option is to locate the PPP unit as a subdivision in the department within the government body dealing with public investment management. Some countries, such as Canada (Québec) or France, have converted their PPP units into infrastructure units with PPP specialists in charge of a specific branch of the public investment organisation.
3. It is critical to the success of PPP units that their role, location and conflicts of interest management mechanisms are well chosen by the CIS member country.
4. Many PPP units provide advisory support and funding to contracting authorities and other SGAs developing PPPs. This usually involves PPP unit staff acting as resource people, but it can include additional funding to pay the costs of transaction advisers. In some cases, PPP units play a leading role in closing the transaction and receive compensation for deal closure.
5. A critical question here is what role PPP units should play in relation to contracting authorities. For departments with far fewer deals, building up PPP capacity may not be cost effective. For example, local authorities in the United Kingdom that implement school and hospital projects rely on support from central bodies.
6. Another essential matter is timing. A PPP unit can assist a contracting authority at the start of its programme, when the authority lacks experience. However, contracting authorities that helped to implement pilot PPPs may have more experience than a newly established PPP unit. In these cases, the PPP unit needs to take care not to slow the more experienced authorities, though it should ensure that they properly address critical issues (such as affordability and value for money).
7. PPP units often play a role in the approval of PPPs developed by contracting authorities. This usually involves providing input into decisions made by others rather than having direct clearance authority. The PPP unit may be involved at three points: after the feasibility study, before the bidding documents are issued and/or before the PPP agreement is signed. In other cases, the link is less direct. In the Philippines, for example, the BOT Centre is just one member of an interagency committee that approves build-operate-transfer projects.

8. This oversight role is potentially the most important one for a PPP unit. In some countries, such as South Africa, the PPP unit's primary role and motivation is to scrutinise the quality, affordability and expected fiscal cost of proposed PPPs. In South Africa, the clear regulatory process for PPPs has helped the unit perform this role. Another way to make guidance binding is by requiring the use of model contracts developed by the PPP unit or to ensure heavy scrutiny by the unit if they are not used.

9. The existing institutional structure in a country usually plays a significant role in determining whether to establish a PPP unit. While the argument against the establishment of separate bodies is the need to separate policy development tasks from technical support during project implementation, some countries have created such bodies. Often, the presence of a PPP unit shows how strongly the government supports the idea of PPP. As stated, the establishment of a dedicated PPP unit serves as confirmation to potential private investors that the state has the necessary qualifications to manage PPP projects.

10. In terms of functions, most dedicated PPP units are involved in technical support and policy guidance. Indeed, these two aspects seem to be the defining characteristic of PPP units across countries. These two functions also follow closely from the rationale for the establishment of PPP units in several countries and can be explained by the rather technical nature of PPPs.

11. Capacity building and PPP promotion also feature in many countries. Capacity building features especially high in countries such as Australia, South Korea, South Africa and the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, the PPP Policy Team and Partnerships UK are responsible for technical support to government entities wishing to enter into PPP agreements, PPP promotion and capacity building. There are differences between PPP units when it comes to their relationship with public entities implementing public-private partnerships and the finance ministry. The units mostly act as consultants for contracting authorities, but may also have a mandatory review dimension.

12. PPP units can be involved in approving projects and fulfilling a gate-keeping role. However, the extent and nature of their involvement varies according to the needs and capacity of individual countries. In the United Kingdom, Australia and South Africa, PPP units fulfil such a gate-keeping role. In Germany and South Korea, the ministry of finance fulfils this role. The difference between these countries coincides with the location of the units; in the United Kingdom, Australia and South Africa, the PPP units reside within the ministry of finance, while in Germany and South Korea, they are independent agencies. Where units are

PPPs themselves (and thus not strictly speaking public bodies), the question also exists as to whether they can be endowed with the necessary authority to green-light projects.

13. In CIS member countries, the PPP units often have advisory, expert and educational functions. For example, the PPP unit in Kazakhstan is established in the form of the PPP Development Centre and has the following functions:

- conducting studies and developing recommendations on PPP
- examining feasibility reports of state PPPs implemented through direct negotiations
- examining tender documentation of state PPPs
- monitoring and evaluating PPP project implementation
- educating specialists
- maintaining the register of PPPs to be implemented.

Other functions related to PPP projects are spread among different government bodies. Many powers are concentrated in the Central Authorised Body on Government Planning, which deals with all state PPPs. Others are distributed between the relevant authority on budget execution, the relevant authority on management of government property, local authorities and the relevant authorities in particular sectors that have powers to initiate and implement PPPs.

14. Another CIS member country that has developed a novel PPP framework is Uzbekistan, where the PPP unit is very important. The PPP Agency has been established under the Ministry of Finance and has broad powers, including:

- examining feasibility reports for PPP projects
- helping to prepare and implement PPPs
- approving or denying PPP project concepts worth less than US\$ 10 million
- approving tender documentation
- engaging consultants for PPP project preparation
- monitoring PPP implementation.